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Abstract
Using nationally representative data on consumption, we show that Blacks and Hispanics devote
larger shares of their expenditure bundles to visible goods (clothing, jewelry, and cars) than do
comparable Whites. These differences exist among virtually all sub-populations, are relatively
constant over time, and are economically large. While racial differences in utility preference
parameters might account for a portion of these consumption differences, we emphasize instead a
model of status seeking in which conspicuous consumption is used as a costly indicator of a
household’s economic position. Using merged data on race and state-level income, we
demonstrate that a key prediction of the status-signaling model -- that visible consumption should
be declining in reference group income -- is strongly borne out in the data for each racial group.
Moreover, we show that accounting for differences in reference group income characteristics
explains most of the racial difference in visible consumption.
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I.

Introduction

In his famous study of consumption during the Gilded Age, Veblen (1899) argued that
“Consumption is evidence of wealth, and thus becomes honorific, and …failure to consume a
mark of demerit,” dubbing consumption that aims to demonstrate one’s economic position to
observers “conspicuous consumption.”

1

In this paper, we study households’ consumption of

items that are readily observable in anonymous social interactions, and that are portable across
those interactions.

We refer to these goods as “visible consumption.”

Prompted by both

Veblen’s insight that the consumption and display of these items communicates information
about economic status, and the fact that few easily observable variables are as strongly correlated
with economic status as is an individual’s race, we investigate a series of questions about visible
consumption and race.
A large body of anecdotal evidence suggests that Blacks devote a larger share of their
overall expenditures to consumption items that are readily visible to observers than do otherwise
similar Whites. Automobiles, clothing, and jewelry are examples of these forms of "visible"
consumption. To date, however, there has been little formal economic analysis on the degree to
which these racial differences in consumption patterns actually exist in the data, what accounts
for them if they do, and what the consequences of any such differential expenditures might be.2
We address these questions in this paper.
The first part of our paper documents differences by race in expenditures devoted to
visible consumption items. Using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) from
1986-2002, we show that although, unconditionally, racial minorities and Whites spend
approximately the same fraction of their expenditures on visible consumption, Blacks and
1
In fact, pre-dating Veblen’s analysis by a 140 years, Adam Smith argued that the desire for rank, and the display of
wealth associated with it, is nearly a universal feature of human behavior (Smith [1759]).
2
One exception is an early piece by Alexis (1970), who examined racial differences in consumption patterns between
1935 and 1960 using data from the Consumer Purchases Survey: 1935-1936 and early waves of the Federal Reserve’s
Survey of Consumer Finances. Similar to the findings we present below, Alexis found that Blacks were much more
likely to spend on clothing (as a share of total expenditures) than similar Whites. Outside of economics, there is also
limited work on the consumption patterns of Blacks. Examples include Mullins (1999), Lamont and Molnar (2001),
and Chambers (2006).
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Hispanics spend about 25 percent more on visible goods, after accounting for differences in
permanent income. These expenditure differences are found for all sub-groups except older
households. We find that these racial gaps have been relatively constant over the past seventeen
years, and that spending on housing or differential treatment in the housing market cannot explain
these patterns. Finally, the gaps are economically large: the absolute annual dollar differential for
visible consumption is on the order of $1,900, which is a non-trivial quantity given Black and
Hispanic average income.
Because of an inter-temporal budget constraint, spending devoted to visible consumption
must be diverted from some alternative use. We show that the higher visible spending of racial
minorities is drawn from both future consumption and all other categories of current
consumption, with Blacks consuming less than Whites in essentially every other expenditure
category (aside from housing) to maintain higher visible consumption.3
What theoretical explanation accounts for these facts? One argument is that racial
differences in expenditures on visible items derive simply from racial differences in preferences that minorities spend more on jewelry, cars, and apparel because they like these items more than
Whites. This argument is consistent with the basic facts, but it essentially tautological. Moreover,
an argument centered on racial differences in preferences yields no prediction that is falsifiable in
the data. An alternative explanation assumes that utility functions are the same across races, but
that some feature of the economic environment makes people from different races place different
marginal valuations on visible consumption items. Apart from the fact that such an explanation
does not simply assume that Blacks behave differently from Whites because they have different
preferences, an argument of this form yields additional, empirically testable predictions beyond
the basic facts described above that should hold within a racial group.
3

As discussed below, housing may be considered a visible good. In fact, we do find that Blacks and Hispanics spend
more on housing than do comparable Whites. Our results (in terms of dollar magnitudes) are slightly stronger if we
include housing as a component of visible consumption. However, given the large literature on racial differences in
housing (which can explain housing expenditure differences), we err on the side of caution by excluding housing from
our base measure of visible goods.
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Our alternative explanation borrows from the extensive theoretical literature on the
demand for social status. According to the signaling version of this literature, individuals derive
utility from status, which depends on others’ beliefs about their income (Ireland 1994; Glazer and
Konrad 1995; Bagwell and Bernheim 1996). While income (or wealth) is not observed, visible
consumption is. The level of an individual’s conspicuous consumption can be expected to
depend on the income distribution from which his income is drawn – his reference group. In
particular, to the extent that visible consumption signals useful information about unobserved
income, visible consumption should rise in own income, and, to the extent being associated with a
poorer reference group has negative informational consequences, visible consumption should fall
in the income of the reference group. Applying these insights, we argue that a status-signaling
model will predict racial differences in visible consumption even if there are no racial differences
in preferences. Since Whites and racial minorities belong to reference groups with different
income distributions, persons with similar incomes will face different incentives to signal by
consuming visibly.

Importantly, if status-signaling is indeed a determinant of visible

consumption, the predictions about the negative relationship between visible expenditures and
higher average reference group income should apply not only across races but also within any
given race in communities with different average incomes.
To assess empirical support for the status-signaling argument, we combine data about
expenditures from the CEX with income data from the Current Population Survey (CPS). We
define an individual’s reference group as persons of the individual’s race living in his state.
Strikingly, we find that, consistent with the status argument, there is a strong negative association
between visible spending and the mean income of one’s reference group within races. That is,
analysis performed on a sample of White households finds the same pattern as separate analyses
conducted for racial minorities: increases in mean income of one’s own race in the state are
associated with reduced visible spending, holding one’s own income constant. As a falsification
test of the status and reference group conjecture, we relate household visible spending to mean
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incomes of other groups in the state and find either no effect or very modest positive effects.
Additionally, we relate household non-visible spending to reference average income and find no
systematic relationship. The results for average reference group income remain qualitatively the
same if we simultaneously control for the dispersion of reference group income, which theory
suggests should also affect visible spending, although the predicted effect is ambiguous.
We next turn to the question: Do differences in reference group income explain the racial
expenditure gaps that are our main focus? In a series of regressions, we show that accounting for
the mean (and to a smaller degree the dispersion) of income in a household’s race/state reference
group explains most of the racial gap in visible spending. This conclusion is robust to a variety of
alternative sample modification and specification tests. Importantly, it is also robust to the
addition of state fixed effects, which account for regional differences across all groups in the
propensity to visibly consume.
On the whole, the paper’s results point to an important role for consumption items, apart
from their direct consumption value. Although this exhibitionistic motivation has long been
discussed in economics, we are aware of very little formal evidence on the question, especially in
terms of the racial differences that are our focus.4

Over the last decade, economists and

sociologists have provided considerable empirical support for the notion that individuals care
about their relative position in their community, often using evidence about subjective well
being.5 Our work complements this literature in that we are able to link consumption patterns to
social concerns by analyzing economic behavior directly. Perhaps more importantly, our specific
focus on racial differences in consumption and our results about the potential role played by the
use and display of visible items suggest that a deeper understanding of the racial gaps in wealth,
savings, and consumption that have long bedeviled economists and others will require further
exploration of the issues raised in this paper.
4

Notable recent exceptions include Ravina (2005) and Kapteyn et al. (2006).
Recent examples include Luttmer (2005), Clark and Oswald (1996), McBride (2001), and Dynan and Ravina (2007).
See also the survey by Kahneman and Krueger (2006) and references therein.
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II.

Data

Our primary source of data for studying racial differences in consumption patterns comes
from the 1986–2002 CEX, collected by the United States Department of Labor. The CEX is an
on-going rotating panel dataset, in which participating households are interviewed up to five
times at three-month intervals. In any given calendar quarter there are approximately 5,000
households in the survey, with some households entering the survey and others exiting. The
initial interview collects household demographic information, which is updated during
subsequent interviews to reflect any changes in household composition. Information on income
during the previous twelve months is collected during the second and fifth interviews.
Additionally, the second through fifth interviews each collects detailed household expenditure
information for the three calendar months immediately preceding the interview.
Like previous users of CEX data, we aggregate to the consumption categories proposed
by Harris and Sabelhaus (2000). We use the CEX family-level extracts made available by the
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).6 Appendix Table A.1 lists the fifteen broad
consumption categories used in the paper and their relationship to the 47 categories in the
Sabelhaus and Harris files. All data are deflated to 2005 dollars using the June CPI-U.
Our primary analysis sample consists of a total of 49,363 households, with heads-ofhousehold between 18 and 49 years old.7 There are 37,289 White households, 6,766 Black
households, and 5,308 Hispanic households. To mitigate the effects of measurement error in the
expenditure categories, the unit of analysis is the average quarterly expenditure in a consumption
category over the period that the household is in the sample. Descriptive statistics for the sample,
by race, are provided in Table 1.

6

The Data Appendix discusses in detail the NBER CEX family extracts, the details of our sample selection criteria, and
the 47 specific expenditure categories included in the Sabelhaus and Harris consumption classification.
7
In some specifications, we explore the robustness of our results by examining the consumption patterns of older
households and the sensitivity of our results to excluding younger households.
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Our focus in this paper is on visible consumption expenditures – items for which
spending is readily observable and highly portable across a variety of interactions, including
anonymous ones. Also, we want to identify goods with the characteristic that individuals who
consume more of them are believed to be of better economic circumstances, on average, than
individuals who consume less of such goods. Simple introspection suggests what these items are
likely to be, but rather than simply asserting what those items are, we conduct an anonymous
online survey of 320 students at the University of Chicago’s Harris School and Graduate School
of Business. After providing basic demographic information, respondents were asked how close
their interaction with someone would have to be in order to ascertain whether that person’s
spending on various expenditure categories was above average. The details of our survey and a
discussion of its results can be found on the online Robustness Appendix to this paper posted on
the QJE web site. Consistent with both common sense and the results of our survey, our analysis
treats visible consumption as expenditures on apparel (including accessories such as jewelry),
personal care, and vehicles (excluding maintenance).
Note that one especially important item is housing. Our survey evidence suggests that
housing is both reasonably observable and that it is perceived to have high income elasticity.
Our concern is that racial differences in housing expenditures might derive from differential
treatment in the housing market – a phenomenon that has been the focus of a large literature.8
Differential treatment in the housing market could, by itself, cause minorities to have very
different housing expenditures than Whites, even absent conspicuous or exhibitionistic
considerations. Previewing our later results, we find that minorities spend more on housing than
do comparable Whites, implying that if housing expenditures were lumped together with other
visible spending the overall estimated difference in visible expenditures we estimate would be

8

There is evidence that minorities face significantly higher rejection rates for mortgages, which serves to limit their
access to owner-occupied housing (see Munnell et al. [1996] and Charles and Hurst [2002]). Moral hazard
considerations cause rental prices to exceed the flow cost from owning an otherwise identical unit, so households who
rent will pay more for housing services, all else equal, than those who own.
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slightly larger. However, given the concerns about differential treatment in the housing market,
we adopt the conservative policy of excluding housing from the measure of total spending in
most of our main results. For the most part, we always treat housing separately, except for some
robustness specifications in which we assess how the results are affected when housing
expenditures are lumped in with overall visible spending.
Appendix Table A.2 summarizes expenditures in our CEX sample on visible and other
goods. Overall, visible consumption expenditures comprise roughly 12 percent of household total
expenditures, while spending on food and shelter represent roughly 20 percent and 25 percent,
respectively, of total expenditures. The table shows that some CEX households spend nothing on
some expenditure categories over their time in the survey. Thus, whereas nearly all households
spend on food, housing, entertainment services, and visible goods, 57 percent of households spent
nothing on education, and around 20 percent spent nothing on alcohol and tobacco.9

III.

Racial Differences in Conspicuous Consumption

Standard consumption theory suggests that total household expenditures should be related
to the household’s permanent income (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954; Friedman 1957):
households with lower permanent incomes should consume less, all else equal.
differences in family size should also affect household consumption.

Likewise,

To explore racial

differences in visible expenditures in our CEX sample, the regression one would want to estimate
is:
(1)

ln(visiblei ) = β 0 + β1 Blacki + β 2 Hispanici + ϕ ( Permanent Income )i + θ X i + ηi ,

where Blacki and Hispanici are indicator variables denoting whether a household head is Black or
Hispanic, respectively; Permanent Income is the household’s permanent income, and X i is a
9

One thing to note from Appendix Table A.2 is that the share of visible expenditures out of total expenditures is
constant across races at 12 percent. These statistics do not imply that the consumption of visible goods is constant
across races. The reason is that visible goods are luxuries (i.e., estimated slopes of within-race Engel curves are much
larger than one). Given that Whites, on average, are much richer than Blacks and Hispanics, the Engel curves would
predict that Whites should allocate a much bigger share of their expenditures to visible goods. In the section that
follows, we estimate all differences in visible spending by race conditioning on household income.
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vector of controls designed to measure differences in age, family structure, and other
demographic variables across households. This vector consists of a quadratic in the age of the
household head, household wealth controls, year effects, and indicator variables for the number of
adults in the household, the number of total family members in the household, marital status,
whether the household head is male, urbanicity, MSA residence, and Census region.10
In order to estimate (1), one needs a good measure of household permanent income. The
CEX asks households to report their various sources of income as household enter the survey.
Many authors have shown that the CEX income data are of poor quality – something we find as
well. As Table I shows, total family income, defined to include labor assets and transfer income,
is missing for 27 percent of the sample. The CEX does not attempt to impute the missing income
data. More importantly, Table I also shows that for those reporting positive income, White
households have 67 percent higher total income than Black households and 61 percent higher
total income than Hispanic households. These numbers are not consistent with those from other
micro data sources designed to measure labor income. For example, using data from the Current
Population Survey (CPS) for a similar time period and making similar sample restrictions, the
comparable racial differences in total family income are 51 and 37 percent, respectively. Since
the CEX’s income measures are not of especially high quality – particularly along racial
dimensions – they are unlikely to accurately reflect racial differences in household permanent
income needed for estimation of (1).
Theory suggests a solution to the problem of poor quality CEX income data. Notice that
the Permanent Income Hypothesis implies that total expenditure is an especially good proxy for a
household’s permanent income. Fortunately, CEX expenditure data are of much higher quality
than its income data. The racial differences in total expenditures from the CEX line up nearly
exactly with the racial differences in total family income from the CPS. Specifically, as seen in
10
For household wealth, we use the log of liquid assets if liquid assets are positive and a dummy for whether the
household has positive liquid assets as controls. Liquid assets are defined as checking, saving, stock, and bond
holdings.
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Table 1, Whites consume 50 percent more and 38 percent more than Blacks and Hispanics,
respectively.
However, proxying for permanent income with the log of total expenditures in (1) raises
two problems. First, since expenditure components are jointly determined in models of lifecycle
consumption, total expenditures are endogenous in an equation for any particular component of
expenditures such as visible expenditures.

Second, there is the purely statistical concern that

measurement error in the components of consumption will be related to measurement error in
total expenditures.
Given these problems, in our CEX sample we estimate
(2)

ln(visiblei ) = β 0 + β1 Blacki + β 2 Hispanici + ϕ ln (Total Expenditure )i + θ X i + ηi

and instrument for the log of total expenditures using the vector of current and permanent income
controls, Incomei . This vector consists of an indicator variable for whether current income is
non-missing, the log of current income if non-missing, a cubic in the level of current income,
three indicator variables for education, and a series of one-digit industry and occupation codes.
Reassuringly, our CEX results are very robust to alternative instrument sets in (2), and in each
case the F-stats on the instrument set are so large as to render irrelevant any “weak-instrument”
concerns.
Table II shows the results of our estimation. When we estimate (2) with only the race
dummies and no other controls, Blacks and Hispanics are found to spend less on visible items
than comparable Whites, by 38 and 24 percent, respectively (row 1). These results simply reflect
the unconditional means of visible expenditures, by race, reported in the first row of Appendix
Table A.2. As we show below, spending on visible goods increases with income, and Blacks and
Hispanics have much lower incomes than do Whites.
The regressions in rows (2)-(4) of Table II control for permanent income in various ways.
The specification in row (2) simply adds the vector Incomei . As expected, the addition of these
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income controls (whose limitation as a measure of permanent income we have already discussed)
increases both the Black and White visible expenditure differences relative to the results shown in
row (1). In row (3), we add the log of total expenditures rather than Incomei . Once this
arguably better proxy for permanent income is added to the regression, we find that Blacks and
Hispanics consume 31 percent and 26 percent more visible goods than Whites with similar
permanent income. Next, given the concerns outlined above about using total expenditures as a
control in a regression for a specific component of expenditures, we instrument the log of total
expenditures with the vector Incomei in row (4). The results in row (4) are similar to those in
row (3).

Specifically, we find that Blacks and Hispanics spend 22 and 19 percent more,

respectively, on visible goods than White households with similar permanent income.
In rows (5)-(6) of the table we add a full set of time and demographic controls to the
specification. These rows show that the addition of time and demographic controls does not
appreciably change the estimated racial differences in visible spending. In our preferred estimate
(row (6) of Table II), Blacks and Hispanics spend 26 percent and 23 percent more, respectively,
on visible goods than do otherwise similar Whites.11
Although to conserve space we do not report point estimates for the non-race coefficients,
two results are worth noting. First, the propensity to purchase visible goods declines sharply with
age for all races. Second, we find that visible goods are luxury goods. Specifically, the estimated
coefficient on the log of total expenditures from the regression shown in row (6) of Table II is 1.5
(standard error = 0.03), implying that a 1 percent increase in total expenditures results in a 1.5
percent increase in visible expenditures. The luxury property of visible goods suggests why it is
essential to control for permanent income when measuring racial differences in visible good
expenditures. It also explains why there is no unconditional racial difference in the share of
11

All of our results are robust to controlling for nonlinear measures of total expenditures. For example, if
we re-estimate the specification shown in row (6) of Table II including both the log of total expenditures
and the square of the log of total expenditures, the estimated coefficients on the Black and Hispanic
indicator variables remain essentially unchanged at 0.27 and 0.24, respectively.
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spending devoted to visible goods: Blacks spend more than Whites on visible goods at every level
of permanent income, but in unconditional comparisons this is obscured by the fact that Whites,
with their higher incomes, consume more of these luxury goods.
The racial difference in visible expenditures is large in absolute dollars. Appendix Table
A.2 shows that, on average, Whites spend about $7,160 on visible items per year. The finding
that Blacks and Hispanics spend 26 percent more than comparable Whites on visible goods
therefore implies that Blacks and Hispanics spend, on average, roughly $1,900 per year more on
visible goods than their White counterparts.

Since the CEX under-reports total household

consumption relative to data from the National Income and Product Accounts, this estimate is
likely a lower bound. To put these magnitudes in perspective, data from the March CPS shows
that, for the 1990-2002 period, Black and Hispanic households had average incomes,
respectively, of $42,500 and $48,300 in 2005 dollars. Outlays on visible goods thus represent a
substantial fraction of the overall budget of minorities.
Figure I plots the estimated non-linear visible expenditures Engel curves for Blacks and
Whites separately. To generate the Engel curves, we regress log visible expenditures on log total
expenditures and log total expenditures squared, separately for Blacks and Whites. As above, we
instrument log total expenditures and log total expenditures squared with the vector Income. The
figure shows that for both Blacks and Whites, on average, visible expenditures are luxury goods.
Also, at every level of log total expenditures Blacks spend more on visible goods then their White
counterparts.12 Notice further that the two Engle curves are parallel over most of the total
expenditures range, mitigating concerns that the main results derive in some way from a
fundamental difference in the shapes of these relationships across race.
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One may ask whether there are differences in “price” effects that cause Blacks to spend more on visible goods than
comparable Whites. For example, if Blacks were discriminated against in the market for visible goods, Blacks with a
given income would pay more for those items than comparable Whites. General discrimination cannot explain the
results in Table II, which control for total expenditures directly. As a result, the correct interpretation of our results
should lead to the question of why Blacks and Hispanics allocate a greater share of their expenditures to visible goods.
There is no evidence that, relative to other goods, Blacks and Hispanics pay higher prices for clothing, jewelry, and
personal care items than similar Whites.
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The finding that racial minorities exhibit a greater propensity to consume visible goods is
robust to a variety of alternative specifications and restrictions, including restricting the sample to
households with positive current income, excluding households with less than $23,200 a year in
total expenditures (the 25th percentile of the expenditure distribution), excluding households
under the age of 24, varying the specific components of the instrument set Incomei , including
log expenditures on housing as an additional control, and restricting the sample to include only
those who completed all four CEX surveys.
Additionally, the racial differences in visible spending are found in all sub-groups in our
sample. For example, single Black men, single Black women, and married Black households
consume 32 percent more, 28 percent more, and 22 percent more than their respective White
counterparts. The racial differences in visible spending are statistically larger among single men
than is the substantial gap among married households. Similar patterns are found among
Hispanics. We find racial differences in visible spending within all education groups, and the gap
for those with only a high school education (-0.30) is not statistically different from the gaps for
those with at least a college degree (-0.23). The racial visible spending difference does diminish
sharply with age. Among households aged 18-34 the Black-White conditional gap in visible
spending is 30 percent, which declines to 23 percent for households aged 35-49, and declines
further to only 15 percent for households aged 50-69.13
Table III presents estimated race differences for the separate components of visible
consumption, namely, vehicles, clothing, and personal care, in the CEX. Panel A presents results
for the full sample, while Panel B presents results for the sample of households that own a
vehicle. In both samples, Blacks and Hispanics spend significantly more on both personal care
and clothing and jewelry than comparable Whites.

For vehicle spending the results are more

nuanced. In the overall sample, both Blacks and Hispanics spend less on cars than do Whites.

13

The online Robustness Appendix presents results for various alternative specifications and sub-samples.
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Among vehicle owners, however, Blacks in the CEX spend around 12 percent more on vehicles
than comparable Whites. The fact that Blacks and Hispanics, all else equal, are less likely to own
vehicles explains why the racial difference in vehicle spending is not found for the full sample.
The lower vehicle ownership among Blacks and Hispanics is likely the result of two factors: the
fact that Blacks and Hispanics are more likely to live in city centers and, as a result, have lower
vehicle needs, and the fact that liquidity constraints may prevent Blacks and Hispanics from
making a sufficient down payment to purchase a vehicle.
If minority households spend more on visible goods than White households with the
same permanent income and demographics, on what expenditures are they spending less? The
inter-temporal budget constraint implies that the observed higher spending on conspicuous goods
must come either from another component of current consumption and/or from future
consumption (i.e., current savings). Table IV looks at the conditional differences in spending on
other consumption categories. Along with visible consumption, these consumption categories
comprise the universe of consumption expenditures in the CEX and are described in Appendix
Table A.1. The coefficients in Table IV come from a regression identical to that reported in row
(6) of Table II, except that the dependent variable is now the log of the particular consumption
category and Tobit models are estimated for categories with a high incidence of zero expenditure.
The first striking fact from Table IV is that there is no evidence that Blacks and Hispanic
allocate a higher percentage of their spending than Whites to any consumption category other
than visible goods and housing. In fact, aside from utilities, Blacks spend less than similar
Whites on all other consumption categories. Some of the differences are small, such as the very
small differences between Blacks and Whites in food expenditures. However, Blacks spend 16
percent less on education, approximately 29 percent less on entertainment, and 50 percent less on
health. Similar patterns emerge for Hispanics.
Both Blacks and Hispanics spend slightly more on housing expenditures for housing and
utilities than their White counterparts, while at the same time spending much less on home
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furnishings. As we have noted, housing may itself be a visible good, which would explain why it
is associated with similar expenditure patterns to those for jewelry, clothing, and vehicles.
However, as discussed above, it is also possible that there may be discrimination against racial
minorities in the housing market. To provide conservative estimates of conspicuous spending
differences, we exclude housing from our measure of visible goods.
To confirm the patterns depicted above about racial consumption differences, we also
estimate a variety of models using the data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
This exercise is important partly to establish whether our main results are found in another
nationally representative data source with information on consumption. Moreover, as noted
previously, although the CEX is the primary source of data on consumption expenditures in the
U.S., and thus serves as our main data source, it is not designed to measure household income.
By contrast, the PSID provides excellent measures of household income over multiple years, so it
is possible to carefully control for permanent income in our regressions. The limitation of the
PSID is that, until recently, it only contained limited measures of household consumption.
Starting in 2005, the survey added an expanded set of expenditure questions, including some
questions about the visible items we study. Currently, these measures are available for only the
2005 wave.
Using data from the 2005 PSID we can examine racial differences in consumption
patterns for these limited set of categories using a different measure of permanent income. These
estimates can then be compared to those from the CEX, where permanent income is proxied by
total expenditures. We restrict the 2005 wave of the PSID to meet the same age and other
restrictions used for the CEX sample.14 We estimate versions of (1) using the log of clothing
expenditures as the dependent variable. Our proxy for the household’s permanent income is the
14
Full sample selection and other details about the PSID sample are provided in the online Robustness Appendix. We
also discuss additional visible expenditures results from the PSID data beyond the estimates of cross-race differences
given here. We also present results about the distribution of retail establishments by the racial makeup of the zip code
with data from the County Business patterns. This evidence is only suggestive, but it does show a higher incidence of
business devoted to selling visible items like clothing in zip codes with higher numbers of racial minorities.
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average of total annual family income between 1999 and 2005 for the years that the household
was in the sample.
Table V presents the results for the measures available in the PSID. Row (1) presents the
estimated racial difference in clothing expenditures when no controls are added to regression (1).
As in the CEX, lower overall income among Blacks means that they tend to spend less on
clothing than do Whites, on average. The specification in row (2) controls for permanent income
and for the full set of demographic controls used in earlier regressions. The results for clothing
are similar to the preferred CEX estimates: Blacks in the PSID spend 24 percent more on clothing
than do comparable Whites. Row (3) presents results for the price of new car purchases – the
only other visible spending we can sharply identify in the 2005 PSID data. The estimate suggests
that Blacks bought cars that were 12 percent more expensive than did similar Whites. Perhaps
because of the small sample size, the effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels,
but it is reassuringly similar to the corresponding estimate from the CEX data.

Similarly

reassuring are the other PSID estimates in the table, which indicate that, as in the CEX, Blacks in
the PSID spend less than similar Whites on food (row 4), entertainment (row 5), and other
transportation (row 6).
The fact that the PSID estimates, which control directly for permanent income using high
quality panel data on income, correspond well with our preferred CEX estimates suggests that the
approach of using total expenditures as a proxy for permanent income and then instrumenting it
using available income measures captures variation in permanent income quite well. Indeed, as
seen in Figure II, the distributions, by race, of total expenditures from the CEX are remarkably
similar to the distributions of household permanent income, by race, in the PSID.
In summary, we find that Blacks and Hispanics spend roughly 30 percent more on visible
expenditures (cars, clothing, jewelry, and personal care items) than do otherwise similar Whites.
These patterns are similar across all sub-groups of the population (with the notable exception that
the differential racial propensity to consume visibly declines sharply with age), across the two
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nationally representative surveys in which this can be studied, and with different methods of
controlling for household permanent income. Strikingly, while minority households consume
more visible goods than comparable Whites, they consume less than or the same amount as
Whites of all other consumption categories aside from housing.
IV.

Status and Conspicuous Consumption

What explains these differences in visible spending? Racial differences across
dimensions as diverse as cuisine, music, and popular entertainment suggest that the consumption
patterns above could derive, in part, from differences in tastes. We eschew this essentially
tautological explanation, however, and investigate instead whether racial consumption differences
can be reconciled within a framework in which no racial preference differences are assumed.
We draw on insights from the literature spawned by the seminal work of Veblen (1899) and
Smith (1759), which centers on the idea that individuals care about their status – the economic
position that others ascribe to them. In this framework, conspicuous consumption is a form of
signaling in the sense demonstrated by Spence (1973). We briefly outline a signaling model of
visible consumption, and discuss its testable implications.15
Consider an economy in which individuals belonging to group k have incomes yik
k
k ⎤
, ymax
.
drawn from a known distribution with density f k ( y ) and support on the interval ⎡ ymin
⎣
⎦

Income is not publicly observed, and is used to finance consumption of two goods: c , which is
observed by outsiders, and ( y − c ) , which is not. Each agent has the same utility, given by:
(3)

(

) ( )

( )

v yik − cik + u cik + w sik ,
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Other formulations of a person’s utility from visible goods are determined by how personal consumption of the good
compares to the average consumption or income in some reference group. See Deusenberry (1949) for an important
early treatment. The NBER working paper version of our paper outlines a model of this form. The main predictions
discussed in this section about how the mean income of one’s reference group affects visible spending can also be
derived within this alternate class of models.
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where u, v, and w are each concave and twice continuously differentiable. In (3), status, sik ,
reflects society’s inference about i ' s income based on things observed about the person. It
follows that sik = E ⎡⎣ yik | cik * , k ⎤⎦ , where cik * is i ' s equilibrium visible consumption, and k is
his group. In the separating equilibrium of this model, each agent chooses consumption so as to
maximize (3) subject to his budget set, and society’s beliefs about income are correct for each

( ( )) = y .

individual, that is, si cik * yik

k
i

Recent theoretical work studies models of this form,

formally characterizing the equilibrium and key comparative statics.16

We summarize and

provide some intuition for these results.
Equilibrium spending on conspicuous goods, cik * , is strictly increasing in yi . The
relationship is concave if utility from status is sufficiently more concave than that for the two
other components of utility. Otherwise, visible spending rises with income in a convex fashion.
Importantly, since the income of the poorest person in a group is correctly assessed, in
equilibrium this person has no incentive to engage in greater consumption of the visible good
than would be true if there were no signaling motive whatsoever.
What does the theory say about the relationship between cik * and changes (or
differences) in the income distribution of a group in the perfectly revealing equilibrium? There
are two results. The first is that as the dispersion of a group’s income distribution increases, the
effect on average conspicuous spending in the group is theoretically ambiguous. The intuition for
the ambiguous result is as follows. Suppose that there is a redistribution in which income is
transferred from A to a richer person B and group income dispersion increases. Since ci* is
strictly increasing in yi , conspicuous spending will decrease for A and increase for B.
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See Mailath (1987), Ireland (1994), and especially Glazer and Konrad (1996) for formal treatments of models of this
form. Our framework borrows most from the work of Glazer and Konrad (1996), who study the signaling value of
observable charitable donations rather than consumption. Otherwise, our framework is virtually identical to theirs. See
their paper for a formal derivation of the predictions discussed here.
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However, since the relationship between ci* and yi may be either concave or convex, the relative
magnitude of the (absolute value of the) decrease in visible spending for A and the increase in
visible spending for B is ambiguous.17
The other result about the distribution of group income is unambiguous: if poorer persons
are added to a group so that the support of the group’s income distribution becomes

⎡ ymin − θ , ymax ⎤ with θ > 0 , and average group income falls, then conspicuous spending rises
⎣
⎦
at every level of income. The intuition is that as poorer people are added to a population, persons
of every level of income must now signal more to distinguish themselves from those immediately
poorer than them, since those people are themselves now compelled to spend more to distinguish
themselves from persons who are even poorer still.
The framework outlined above is quite general. Depending on the situation, different
types of expenditures may be visible to observers. More importantly, the reference groups k
represent, in theory, any type of grouping into which a population can be sorted. Depending on
the situation, observers will know more or less about the distribution from which other
individuals’ un-observed income is drawn. In other words, the particular reference group k that
is used to draw inferences about individual income will vary from one context to another. The
key prediction is that information about one’s reference group influences observers’ inferences
about one’s income, and thus interacts with the optimal choice of signaling expenditures.
The patterns in Figure II showing that Blacks have a much lower permanent income, on
average, than Whites suggest that the higher relative visible spending of Blacks is consistent with
the main prediction of a status model if race is the only exogenous observable characteristic that
helps one infer an individual’s socioeconomic position. But, even in a random anonymous

17
It has also been shown that equilibrium conspicuous signaling is invariant to a replication of the distribution of
income. That is, conspicuous signaling should be unaffected by differences in the size of groups, all else equal. See
Glazer and Konrad (1996).
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situation, an observer of a Black (White) person will typically know more about the person’s
income than that it is drawn from the national income distribution of Blacks (Whites). At a
minimum, the observer knows that the person’s income is likely drawn from the Black (White)
income distribution in the state where the person resides.18 If k is taken to represent different
race/state cells, several interesting testable predictions from the status-signaling model follow.
First, differential visible spending should be observed not only across races based on the
mean and dispersion of racial incomes, but also among persons of the same race in different
states. Further, the overall income distribution in different states should not determine visible
spending for a given race; only the income distributions of people in the state of a person’s own
race should matter. Finally, if visible spending is truly driven by status-seeking behavior, the
estimated racial differences in visible spending shown in the previous section would be
eliminated, or at least substantially reduced, if controls for the mean and dispersion of the
person’s race/state cell were added to the regressions. We analyze these implications below.19

V.
5.A.

Empirical Tests of Conspicuous Consumption Model

Explaining Within-Race Conspicuous Consumption Differences
Before conducting separate within-race analyses of conspicuous spending behavior, we

explore whether there is evidence to support the idea that persons of a given level of income, and
belonging to a particular race/state cell, spend more on visible goods than do similar persons
belonging to race/state cells with higher average income. Using the same CEX sample described
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In fact, observers likely have more detailed spatial information than a person’s state. We define reference groups
with respect to state because the state is the lowest level of spatial aggregation available in our CEX data. In the
Robustness Appendix, we use the PSID data to explore the sensitivity of our empirical results to the use of finer levels
of spatial aggregation.
19
The signaling interpretation for conspicuous spending may also account for the fact that conspicuous consumption
differences decline with age, as shown in Section III. Younger persons, given their greater involvement in marriage
and other social markets as they search for spouses and friends, are likely more concerned than their older counterparts
about outsiders’ assessments of their wealth and should be more likely to conspicuously consume as a result.
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above, we estimate the following regression of the total visible spending of an individual i of race
r living in state s: 20

ln(visibleisr ) = β 0 + δ sr ( Γ s ∗ Γ r ) + ϕ log(Total Expenditurei ) + θ X i + ηi ,

(4)

where

Γs

and

Γr

are vectors of state and race effects, respectively; and where, as in previous

regressions, log total expenditures proxies for permanent income and is instrumented for with the
vector Income (described above). Figure III plots the estimated effects

δ sr

against the mean

level of income for the particular race/state cell as estimated in the Current Population Survey.
We use data from the 1990 through the 2002 March Current Population Surveys (CPS) to
compute the mean labor income of White males by state.21 To be consistent with our CEX
sample, we restrict the CPS sample to only include individuals between the ages of 18 and 49
(inclusive).
Two results are striking in Figure III. First, there is a negative and strongly statistically
significant relationship between the mean income of a race/state cell and average spending on
visible items among persons in that cell, relative to similar persons belonging to other race/state
groupings. This result, estimated across all race/state cells, is consistent with the prediction of the
status-seeking model.

Notice also that the distribution of visible expenditures for different

race/age cells supports the cross-race evidence presented earlier: Black race/state cells have lower
permanent incomes and higher visible spending, White race/state cells have substantially higher
permanent incomes and lower visible spending, and Hispanic race/state cells are, on average,
between those for Blacks and Whites on both dimensions.

20
Otherwise, the controls are identical to those used in row (6) of Table II, and the sample restrictions are the same as
discussed above.
21
The labor income of adult men of a person’s state/race cell is our main measure of average reference group income.
We also tried several alternative measures for reference group income, including total family income and total family
labor of all persons of the individual’s race/state cell. In all that follows, the results are essentially unchanged under
these alternative income specifications. We use the CPS to estimate our measure of the mean income of the reference
group within each state as opposed to the CEX data because of both the large sample sizes available in the CPS and the
better quality income data.
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What is the evidence about visible spending for people of the same race? To answer this
question we estimate separately for each race the regression given by
(5)

ln(visibleik ) = β 0 + δ1 ( μky ) + δ 2 ( Dky ) + ϕ Expenditurei + θ X i + ηi ,

where k is a race/state cell for the particular race, and μk and Dk are, respectively, the (log of)
y

y

the mean and dispersion of income for persons in the race/state cell. As before, we instrument for
Expenditurei using the vector Incomei. Henceforth, we measure the dispersion of income in a
race/state by the coefficient of variation—a dimensionless measure of dispersion. As noted
previously, mean and dispersion are estimated from CPS income.
Table VI presents results for Whites in the CEX. Column (1) of Table VI shows that the
base estimate of δ1 is a strongly statistically significant -0.60. This implies that doubling mean
state income of Whites reduces visible expenditures of Whites by 60 percent, all else equal. The
specification in the second column adds the coefficient of variation. In this regression, we
continue to find that average income of Whites in a White household’s state is associated with
lower visible spending, all else equal. Indeed, the point estimate on mean reference group income
is larger than the specification in column (1). These basic results for average reference group
income in columns (1) and (2) are strongly consistent with the main prediction of the statussignaling model. Higher dispersion in reference group income is shown to lower White visible
spending, with an effect that is strongly statistically significant in column (2). As discussed
above, the theory is ambiguous about the sign of the effect of reference group income dispersion
on visible spending.
A potential concern about the results in the first two columns is that there may be some
factor correlated with average state income that mechanically causes reduced spending on visible
goods. Differences across states in housing prices represent one such factor. Consider a state
where the price of housing is high, all else equal. Individuals with a given level of income in that
state will spend more for the same amount of housing, and less on other consumption items
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including perhaps visible items. To account for this, we control directly for the individual’s log
housing expenditures in our estimation of (5).

Given the endogeneity of individuals’

expenditures on housing with respect to their total and visible expenditure decisions, we
instrument individual housing expenditures with the mean value of house prices in the
household’s state of residence.22 We compute the mean value of house prices using data from the
1990 and 2000 U.S. Census. For households in the CEX from 1986-1994, we use the 1990
Census average state house price; for CEX households from 1995-2002, we use the 2000 Census
average state house price.23
Column (3) of Table VI shows the results from including log individual housing prices
(instrumented with state housing prices) as an additional control. We find that controlling for
individual housing expenditures reduces slightly the estimated effect of both the mean and
dispersion of reference group income on Whites’ visible spending. Both effects, however, remain
significant after controlling for housing expenses.
Apart from concerns about state-level differences in housing costs, there is a possibility
that a state’s level of income might be related to the menu of prices its residents pay for different
consumption items. For example, the generosity of transfer or insurance programs might vary
with a state’s average level of income. If so, Whites with the same level of income in different
states would effectively pay different prices for and consume different amounts of various
consumption items in the different states. In particular, we would expect to find a negative
pattern between state income and levels of expenditure for other items.
The specifications in columns (4) and (5) are identical to those in column (3), except the
outcome variables are, in turn, the log of food expenditures and the log of all expenditures minus
reported visible and housing expenditures. In stark contrast to the results for visible goods, we
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The first-stage relationship between housing expenditures and state housing prices is very strong, with F-stats on the
excluded instruments well in excess of 50.
23
The ordinal relationship across states in average housing prices is so strong that it does not matter if instead we used
only the 1990 house price or only the 2000 price.

23

find no evidence of a negative relationship between higher average reference group income and
these expenditures among Whites. Indeed, food expenditures increase with state income for
Whites. For total non-visible expenditures, we find no evidence of any systematic relationship
between Whites’ propensity to spend on these items across states and mean levels of White
incomes in the state.

Overall, for Whites, the sharp negative relationship between visible

expenditures and mean reference group income does not exist for other categories of
expenditures. These results provide strong support for the main unambiguous prediction of the
status-signaling model that visible spending is negatively related to the economic status of the
reference group from which a person’s income is drawn, all else equal.
Table VII presents within-race estimates for a pooled sample of Blacks and Hispanics.
We pool together Blacks and Hispanics to increase the sample size for our estimation. However,
aside from larger standard errors, the point estimates in the pooled regression are similar to the
point estimates we get if we restrict the sample to include only Blacks or only Hispanics. The
measure of μk used for the results in Table VII is the mean income of either Black men in the
y

state if the household head is Black, or the mean income of Hispanic men in the state if the
household head is Hispanic. The results indicate that among racial minorities, visible spending is
lower the higher the mean income of racial minorities in the state. The point estimate indicates
that a doubling of the average of minority incomes lowers minority visible spending by 44
percent, all else equal.
In the second column we add the dispersion of reference group income to the regression.
The estimated effect of μk in this regression is still strongly negative. Interestingly, unlike the
y

White regressions, we find that greater dispersion of reference group income is associated with
lower visible spending for minorities. Although we have stressed a reluctance to rely on racial
preference differences to explain our results, recall that the sign of the dispersion has been shown
theoretically to depend crucially upon the relative curvatures of the different components of the
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utility function. We cannot reject the possibility that this curvature might differ across races,
which would explain the difference in the income dispersion results.
We control for the log of individual housing expenditures – instrumented with mean state
housing prices - in column (3) of Table VII, and find that the estimated effect of both the mean
and dispersion of reference group income remains essentially unchanged. In column (4) of Table
VII, we include the mean income of all men in the state as an additional regressor. Strikingly, we
continue to find that Blacks and Hispanics have lower visible expenditures when the mean
income of their race-based reference group is higher. However, if the mean income of all men in
the state increases, holding the mean income of men from the person’s own race constant, visible
expenditures increase.
The final two columns of the table repeat the exercise conducted earlier for Whites: we
estimate the same regression as in column (3), but now with food expenditures and all non-visible
plus housing spending as the outcomes. The results are very similar to those for Whites. There is
some evidence that food spending varies positively with average reference group income; but for
total non-visible spending, the very small point estimates indicate that the qualitative impact of
higher mean reference group incomes of expenditures is zero.
Overall, the within-race results are strongly consistent with the status-signaling model
outlined above. If the mean income of a person’s own race/state cell increases, the person spends
less on visible expenditures, all else equal. This fact is found among Whites, Blacks, and
Hispanics, and persists even after controlling for differences in housing expenditures across
states.

V.B.

Explaining Racial Differences in Visible Expenditures
We analyze next whether the racial differences in visible consumption presented earlier

in the paper can be reconciled by a status model with the key features described in the previous
section. Using the same methods as described above, we re-estimate equation (2) -- with which
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we earlier documented the differences in visible spending across races, --but now add to that
regression, for each individual, the mean and coefficient of variation of income in the household’s
race/state cell. This regression assesses whether Blacks or Hispanics, holding their own income
and the mean income of the racial peer group constant, have the same visible expenditures as
Whites, all else equal. The results are shown in Table VIII. Column (1) displays the results from
row (6) of Table II in which we do not control for features of reference group income distribution.
Without reference group income controls, observationally equivalent Black and Hispanic maleheaded households consume 26 and 23 percent more on visible goods, respectively, than do
Whites.
The regression in column (2) continues to exclude reference group income but now adds
state fixed effects. The estimated effects of 0.28 and 0.25 show that the state fixed effects have
no influence on the estimated racial gaps in visible expenditures. In the third column we add, for
each individual, the average income of their race/state reference group and exclude the state fixed
effects. This regression shows dramatically that our control for reference group income explains
nearly the entire gap in spending across races. Both the Black and Hispanic point estimates are
quantitatively tiny and statistically indistinguishable from zero. Column (4) adds state fixed
effects to the regression in the third column, and the fifth column adds both state fixed effects and
the coefficient of variation of reference group income. The results in both of these specifications
are qualitatively the same as the results in column (3). In summary, the results show that the
visible expenditure differences between Blacks and Hispanics versus Whites vanish once we
control for the average income of the race/state cells from which individuals’ incomes are drawn.
Importantly, the results also indicate that it is not some generic trait of the state that explains the
conspicuous consumption gap, but rather the incomes of individuals’ racial reference groups
specifically.
Income distributions of reference groups are not exogenously assigned in our regressions.
In practice, persons who differ in ways unrelated to conspicuous preferences may choose to
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locate in one place versus another. Could our results be explained by systematic sorting whereby,
for example, persons whose high discount rates make them buy more visible items than
investment goods locate in states where the mean income for their racial group is high? Lacking
instrumental variables for location in our regressions, we cannot rule out this possibility, but two
empirical facts suggest it is unlikely. First, the results in Table IV indicate that racial minorities
spend less than comparable Whites on tobacco and alcohol – goods most consumed by those with
high discount rates. Second, contrary to what a sorting story would imply, Tables VI and VII find
no relationship between spending devoted to all non-visible, non-food items and average income
in race/state cells.
On the whole, these results are strongly consistent with the predictions of the models of
status and conspicuous consumption discussed in Section IV. This simple model appears to
explain differences in individual visible consumption within and across races, and does so
without requiring that there be systematic differences in preferences by race. Race is important
only insofar as it provides information to an observer about the income distribution from which a
person’s income is drawn, creating in the process a differential incentive for people of different
races to engage in conspicuous signaling.

VI.

Conclusion

In this paper we document divergent patterns of expenditures on visible consumption
goods across races. Consistent with popular perception, we find that minorities spend more on
conspicuous items than Whites, controlling for differences in income. A variety of estimates
show that these visible expenditure differences are relatively large and are associated with
substantial diversion of resources from other uses, such as health care and education.
Next, we argue that one does not need to appeal to cultural or racial differences in
preferences to understand this evidence. Specifically, we outline a model of status-seeking and
conspicuous consumption in which individuals use conspicuous spending as a signal of income.
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Consistent with results from a growing theoretical literature that suggest visible consumption
should rise as poorer persons are added to a reference group, we find that visible consumption
both within and across races falls as the mean of reference group income rises. This finding is
buttressed by additional tests that show racial consumption spending differences are sharply
reduced when we control for the mean and dispersion of reference group income, which jointly
provide a powerful empirical measure of the reference distribution. Of course, our results do not
rule out the possibility that there may yet be racial differences in utility parameters that act in
combination with the effects we have identified.
Note that the random, anonymous social interactions that are the focus of our paper
constitute only a subset of the possible interactions that people care about. Depending on the
interaction, an observer will already have finer or coarser information about the particular income
distribution from which the person’s income happens to be drawn, meaning that the relevant
reference groups across different interactions may be narrower or broader than the race/state cells
we study. Further, the specific types of goods used to signal economic position in different
interactions may also be different than the items in this paper. For example, among friends or
family status-signaling might be effected with home furnishings, entertainment durables, or
spending on children’s education – expenditures that only intimates have an opportunity to
observe. Interesting avenues for future work include an investigation of which specific types of
conspicuous consumption matter in different contexts, and whether people choose their neighbors
with an eye to satisfying status considerations.
Our findings on status-signaling may have policy implications. Recent authors have
suggested that a desire for social status informs such behavior as the spending on weddings in
rural India (Bloch , Rao, and Desai 2003), or the expenditures of recent immigrants (Chung and
Fisher 2001). That these status-related expenditures may represent inefficient transfers from
spending on goods such as healthcare, education, or savings has been forcefully argued by Frank
(2000). Ireland (1994) investigates whether the provision of monetary rather than certain in-kind
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transfers may lead to superior outcomes, since the receipt and use of money communicates much
less negative information about economic position than is true of observable in-kind benefits.
Our results on conspicuous spending and race offer further evidence that understanding the
complicated nature and possible consequences of status-signaling is an important area for future
work.

University of Chicago and National Bureau of Economic Research
University of Chicago and National Bureau of Economic Research
University of Pennsylvania
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Data Appendix

For our primary analysis, we use the extracts of the Consumer Expenditure Survey
(CEX), compiled by Harris and Sabelhaus (2000) and available online through the National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).24 The NBER CEX files are available from 1980Q1 –
2003Q1, and we use data from 1986 to 2002. The year 1986 is the first year that the CEX data
included unique family identifiers, which we need to merge key additional information from the
BLS’s raw CEX data files. The NBER CEX extracts were intended to provide a condensed
version of original data that was consistent over time. The extracts include information from the
CEX family files, member files, the detailed expenditure files, and the detailed income files. The
extracts aggregate spending over 500 detailed items in the raw data into 47 spending categories.
Our analysis further aggregates spending into 15 categories, as summarized in Appendix Table
A1. The 15 categories we use in this paper comprise the universe of all expenditure categories in
the NBER CEX files. We restrict the NBER-CEX data to include only household heads
(ensuring that there is only one observation per household in our data). After deletions, our
sample includes 49,363 households, comprising 37,289 White households, 6,766 Black
households, and 5,308 Hispanic households.

We briefly summarize any modifications and restrictions we imposed on the data.
• The NBER CEX files do not include state of residence, Hispanic origin, city size, number of
adults in the household, and number of quarters that the household participated in the survey.
We download these key variables from the CEX raw files and merged them with the analysis
sample manually.
• As is standard in the literature, we compute a measure of housing service flows. For renters,
this is the rent for their home/apartment; for homeowners, this is the homeowner’s report of
the rental equivalence of their home. In the analysis, we experiment with other measures of
housing flow services, such as setting it to 6% of the homeowner’s housing value. The results
are unaffected.
• The analysis uses two measures of vehicle spending: a “limited” measure that includes only
net outlays (mostly down payments) associated with the initial purchase of the vehicle, and an
“expanded” measure that includes the repayment of principle on vehicle loans, spending on
maintenance, leasing, repairs, storage and rental, and spending on tires, tubes, accessories, and
other parts.
• Our measure of housing services spending includes spending on the rental of household
furniture and spending on home maintenance (such as paint, roof repair and replacement),
home remodeling (adding an addition), and home decorating (wall-to-wall carpeting,
replacement of hard wood floors). The inclusion of these categories is an artifact of the NBER
CEX files. The measure of rent paid for tenant-occupied dwellings in the NBER CEX files
combines a broad set of housing expenditures aside from rent paid and as a result, it is
impossible to disaggregate the data at a finer level.
24

See http://www.nber.org/data/ces_cbo.html for the data files. See http://www.nber.org/ces_cbo/Cexfam.doc for
corresponding documentation. All data and code used to generate the results in this paper can be found at
http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu/erik.hurst/research/race_and _consumption_data_page.html.
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• The NBER CEX files report the sum of spending in a variety of categories across all quarters
that the household participated in the survey. Households surveyed for two quarters will
therefore have only half the total expenditures of otherwise identical households participating
for all four quarters. The NBER CEX files do not include an indicator variable for the number
of quarters that the household participated in the survey, although a summary variable
indicates that less than 50% of the sample completes all fours surveys. After manually
merging in the exact number of quarters that the household participated in the survey, we reexpress the spending data on a per-quarter basis where per-quarter spending in a given
category is computed as the NBER-CEX data spending in a given category divided by the
number of quarters that the household participated in the survey.

We made the following restrictions to the CEX sample:
• We include only households reporting themselves as Black, White, or Hispanic. We treat
mixed race heads as Hispanics in our analysis. This has no effect on the results, as the results
are the same if we exclude these households.
• We exclude households with total expenditures of over $400,000 per year (in $2005). These
98 households are the top 0.1% percent of the total expenditures distribution.
• We exclude households that changed their state of residence during the year; in which the
head’s education is missing (4,134 households); and where the household’s region is missing
(617 households);
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Table I
Descriptive Statistics of CEX Full Sample
All
White

Black

Hispanic

Age

35.7

35.9

35.8

34.5

Education < 12

0.11

0.06

0.14

0.38

Education = 12

0.30

0.28

0.38

0.29

Education: Some College

0.29

0.30

0.31

0.21

Education: College or More

0.30

0.36

0.16

0.11

Married

0.55

0.58

0.35

0.61

Family Size

2.9

2.8

3.0

3.7

Number of Adults

1.9

1.9

1.8

2.2

Fraction with Zero/Missing Income

0.27

0.26

0.31

0.25

Total Family Income | Income > 0

$57,800

$63,800

$38,400

$39,800

Quarterly Total Expenditure

$10,700

$11,600

$7,700

$8,400

Sample Size

49,363

37,289

6,766

5,308

Notes: Data from the 1986 – 2002 waves of the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). All expenditures
are averaged over all quarters that the household remained in the survey. The sample includes all
households where the head is between the ages of 18 and 49 (inclusive) and where the head reported their
race as being White, Black, or Hispanic over all quarters in the sample. We also restrict the data to
households that did not change their state during their sample period and who have non-missing values for
the head’s educational attainment, total household family size, and Census region where the household
resides. All amounts are in 2005 dollars. In this table, age and education refer to the household head.

Table II
Estimated Black-White Gap in Log Visible Expenditures With and Without Income, Expenditure, and Demographic Controls
Regression Controls Included
Black Coefficient
Hispanic Coefficient
1.

No Additional Controls

-0.38
(0.04)

-0.23
(0.04)

2.

Specification 1 Plus Income Controls

-0.03
(0.03)

0.14
(0.04)

3.

Specification 1 Plus Log Total Expenditure

0.31
(0.03)

0.26
(0.06)

4.

IV Regression where Log Total Expenditure is Instrumented with Income Controls

0.23
(0.03)

0.20
(0.05)

5.

Specification 4 Plus Time Dummies

0.24
(0.03)

0.21
(0.05)

6.

Specification 5 Plus Demographic and Wealth Controls

0.26
(0.02)

0.23
(0.05)

Notes: See the note to Table I for sample description and relevant sample sizes. The table reports the coefficient on the race dummies from a regression of the
log of household visible consumption on race dummies and other controls. Specification 2 includes the log of current household income, if income is positive, a
cubic in the level of current household income, a dummy for whether current household income is positive, as well as dummies for the education level (four
categories), occupation (1-digit), and industry (1-digit) of the household head. Specification 3 re-estimates specification 1 including the log of total household
expenditures as an additional regressor. Specification 4 is an IV regression where log total expenditures is instrumented with the income controls (added in
specification 2). Specification 5 is the same as specification 4 but also includes year dummies. Specification 6 is the same as specification 5 but also includes a
quadratic in age of the household head, a dummy if the household head is male, a married dummy, Census region dummies, a dummy if the household lived in an
MSA, an urban dummy, wealth controls, and a series of separate dummies for the number of adults and children in the household. See Section III for a full
description of these regressions. Robust standard errors (clustered at the state level) are reported in parentheses.

Table III
Racial Differences in Log Spending on Specific Visible Items, Controlling for Income, Expenditure, and Demographic Controls
A. Full Sample
B. Positive Car Spending
Black
Hispanic Dummy
Black
Hispanic Dummy
Visible Consumption Sub-Category
Dummy
Dummy
Clothing/Jewelry

0.38
(0.03)

0.41
(0.04)

0.36
(0.04)

0.37
(0.02)

Personal Care

0.73
(0.05)

0.43
(0.03)

0.81
(0.06)

0.42
(0.05)

Cars (Limited)

-0.43
(0.07)

-0.29
(0.10)

0.12
(0.04)

0.09
(0.06)

Cars (Including maintenance)

-0.46
(0.10)

-0.34
(0.17)

0.09
(0.03)

0.04
(0.05)

Note: For panel A, the sample and specification are the same as the sample and specification used in Row 6 of Table II except for the fact that the dependent
variable is a sub-component of visible consumption (cars, clothing and jewelry, or personal care). The sample for panel B is the same as the sample for panel A
except for the further restriction that the household must report owning at least one automobile (sample size = 11,900 households). The limited measure of car
spending includes only initial outlays for new or used cars. The expanded car spending measure includes the initial outlays plus expenditures on car services and
the principal component of their vehicle loan payment. See the Data Appendix for more details on the two car measures. Our primary measure of visible
consumption only includes the limited measure of car spending. Robust standard errors (clustered at the state level) are in parentheses.

Table IV
Differences in Log Expenditures by Category Among Blacks, Hispanics, and Whites
A. IV Regressions
Black
Hispanic
Log Expenditure Category
Coefficient
Coefficient
Housing

0.03
(0.02)

0.13
(0.03)

Utilities

0.09
(0.03)

-0.02
(0.02)

Food

-0.06
(0.02)

0.06
(0.02)

Other Transportation

-0.15
(0.03)

-0.02
(0.04)

Entertainment Services

-0.29
(0.03)

-0.36
(0.05)

Home Furnishings a

-0.18
(0.04)

0.09
(0.05)

Education a

-0.16
(0.10)

-0.30
(0.12)

Entertainment Durables a

-0.35
(0.05)

-0.17
(0.05)

Health a

-0.51
(0.05)

-0.48
(0.06)

Alcohol and Tobacco a

-1.04
(0.05)

-1.04
(0.05)

Notes: The sample and specification are the same as those used in row (6) of Table II except for the fact
that the dependent variable is the log of all other consumption categories. These consumption categories are
defined in Appendix Table A.1. The consumption categories denoted with a superscript ‘a’ have a nontrivial fraction of the respondents reporting zero spending on these categories in a given year (see Appendix
Table A.2). For these categories, we estimate the specification using a Tobit and report the corresponding
unconditional marginal effects. Robust standard errors (clustered at the state level) are in parentheses.

Table V
Differences in Log Expenditures by Category Across Blacks and Whites, PSID Data
Log Expenditure Category
Coefficient on Black Dummy
Visible Spending
1. Clothing Expenditures, No Additional Controls

Sample Size

-0.07
(0.07)

3,928

2. Clothing Expenditures, Full Controls

0.24
(0.07)

3,928

3. Price of Recent Car Purchase, Full Controls

0.12
(0.09)

1,882

-0.12
(0.03)

4,167

5. Entertainment, Full Controls

-0.33
(0.08)

3,724

6. Other Transportation, Full Controls

-0.09
(0.06)

3,708

Other Spending Categories
4. Food Expenditures, Full Controls

Notes: The sample includes all households in the 2005 wave of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics where the head is between the ages of 25 and 49
(inclusive). The sample is also restricted to include only households where the head is either Black or White. The table displays the coefficient on the Black
dummy of a regression of log spending for different consumption categories on a race dummy only (specification in row 1) and a race dummy, the log of
household permanent income, a cubic in the age of the household head, a dummy for the sex of the household head, a marital status dummy, and a vector of
family size, number of children, and region dummies (specifications in rows 2-6). For our measure of permanent income, we average total household annual
family income between 1999 and 2005 for the years that that the household was in the sample. See Section III for complete details. Sample sizes differ across
the specifications given that we restricted each specification to only include households with positive spending on the given category. Nearly all the sample
conducted some spending on food expenditures and clothing, and nearly all consumed some form of entertainment and other transportation. The purchasing of a
vehicle during the prior three years was limited to roughly 50% of the sample. All data are weighted using the PSID core family weights. Robust standard errors
(clustered at the state level) are in parentheses.

Table VI
Within-White Differences in Visible Expenditure By Mean Income of Own Race Within a State
Dependent Variable

Log of Mean Income of Own Race in State

Coefficient of Variation of Income for Own Race
in State
Log of Individual Housing Expenditures

(3)

Log Food
Expenditure
(4)

Log Total
Expenditure
Less Visible and
Housing
Expenditures
(5)

-0.70
(0.14)

-0.58
(0.13)

0.23
(0.06)

-0.01
(0.05)

-0.72
(0.30)

-0.63
(0.28)

0.59
(0.10)

-0.06
(0.03)

-0.13
(0.06)

0.01
(0.03)

-0.15
(0.02)

(1)

Log Visible Expenditure
(2)

-0.60
(0.14)

Notes: The sample in the table is the same as that used in Table II except for the additional restriction that it only include White households (n = 37,289). For
column (1), the specification is the same as in row (6) of Table II except for the following two changes: the race dummies are dropped as regressors and the log
of mean total household labor income of White men in the household’s state of residence is included as a regressor. In column (2), we also add the coefficient of
variation for total labor income of White men in the household’s state of residence. In column (3), we add in the log of individual housing prices as an additional
regressor. We instrument individual housing expenditures with the mean level of housing prices in the individual’s state of residence. See Section V for a
discussion of how we use CPS data to compute the mean and standard deviation of total labor income for men by state and for a discussion of how we use data
from the 1990 and 2000 U.S. Census to compute state housing prices. Columns (4) and (5) repeat the specification shown in column (3) with two different
dependent variables. In column (4), the dependent variable is the log of household food spending. In column (5), the dependent variable is the log of household
total spending less spending on visible goods and less spending on housing. Robust standard errors (clustered at the state level) are shown in parentheses.

Table VII
Within-Black and -Hispanic Differences in Visible Expenditure By Mean Income of Own Race Within a State
Dependent Variable

(1)
Log of Mean Income of Own Race in State

Coefficient of Variation of Income for Own
Race in State
Log of Individual Housing Expenditures

Log Mean Income of All in State

-0.44
(0.13)

Log Visible Expenditure
(2)
(3)

(4)

Log Food
Expenditure
(5)

Log Total
Expenditure
Less Visible
and Housing
Expenditures
(6)

-0.51
(0.12)

-0.45
(0.13)

-0.64
(0.15)

0.12
(0.08)

-0.02
(0.03)

0.25
(0.17)

0.26
(0.18)

0.26
(0.17)

-0.14
(0.07)

-0.02
(0.04)

-0.09
(0.08)

-0.16
(0.09)

0.16
(0.04)

-0.14
(0.03)

0.60
(0.31)

Notes: The sample in the table is the same as that used in Table II except for the additional restriction that it only include Black and Hispanic households (n =
12,074). For column (1), the specification is the same as in row (6) of Table II except for the following two changes: the race dummies are dropped as
regressors and the log of mean total household labor income of men of the household’s same race in the household’s state of residence is included as a regressor.
In column (2), we also add in the coefficient of variation for total labor income of the household’s same race in the household’s state of residence. In Column
(3), we add in the log of individual housing prices as an additional regressor. We instrument individual housing expenditures with the mean level of housing
prices in the individual’s state of residence. In column (4), we add the log of mean total labor income for all men in the household’s state of residence. See
Section V for a discussion of how we use CPS data to compute the mean and standard deviation of total labor income for men by state and for a discussion of
how we use data from the 1990 and 2000 U.S. Census to compute state housing prices. Columns (5) and (6) repeat the specification shown in column (3) with
two different dependent variables. In column (5), the dependent variable is the log of household food spending. In column (6), the dependent variable is the log
of household total spending less spending on visible goods and less spending on housing. Robust standard errors (clustered at the state level) are shown in
parentheses.

Table VIII
Racial Differences in Log Visible Expenditures after Controlling for Mean Group State Income, Including Own Income, Expenditure, and
Demographic Controls
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Black Coefficient

0.26
(0.02)

0.28
(0.02)

-0.03
(0.07)

-0.005
(0.07)

-0.04
(0.07)

Hispanic Coefficient

0.23
(0.05)

0.26
(0.03)

-0.01
(0.08)

-0.01
(0.06)

-0.04
(0.07)

-0.53
(0.12)

-0.51
(0.11)

-0.52
(0.11)

Log of Mean Own Group Income in State

Coefficient of Variation of Income for Own Race
in State

State Fixed Effects Included

0.17
(0.12)

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Notes: The table shows the results of the regression of log visible consumption on race dummies and a full set of income, total expenditures, demographic, and
year controls. These controls are the same as those used in the regression displayed in row (6) of Table II (see the note to Table II for details). The first column
of this table replicates the results shown in row (6) of Table II. In the second column, we include state fixed effects. In the third column, we add the log of mean
total household income for men of the household’s same race in the household’s state of residence as an additional control (but exclude state fixed effects). In
the fourth column, we include both state fixed effects and the log of mean income for the household’s own race within their state of residence. In column (5), we
include the coefficient of variation of income for one’s own race within their state of residence. Robust standard errors (clustered at the state level) are in
parentheses.

Our Spending Categories

Appendix Table A.1
Aggregation of the NBER CEX Files
Corresponding NBER CEX Spending Categories

Visible Spending Components
Clothing/Jewelry
Personal Care
Vehicle (Limited)
Vehicle (Expanded)

Clothing and Shoes (029), Clothing Services (030), Jewelry
and Watches (031)
Toilet Articles and Preparations (032), Barbershops, Beauty
Parlors, and Health Clubs (033)
Net Outlay on New and Used Motor Vehicles (052)
Net Outlay on New and Used Motor Vehicles (052), Repair,
Leasing, Greasing, Washing, Parking, Storage, and Rental
(054), Reduction of Principal on Vehicle Loan (096), Tires,
Tubes, Accessories, and Other Parts (053)

Other Spending Components
Housing

Food
Utilities
Other Transportation

Entertainment Services
Entertainment Durables
Alcohol and Tobacco
Household Furnishings
Education
Health

Other

Tenant-Occupied Nonfarm Dwellings – Rent (including the
rental of furniture and appliances) (034), Rental Equivalence
of Owned Home (075)
Food Off-Premise (023), Food On-Premise (024), Food
Furnished Employees (025)
Electricity (038), Gas (039), Water and Other Sanitary
Services (040), Fuel Oil and Coal (040), Telephone (042)
Vehicle Gasoline and Oil (055), Bridge, Tunnel, Ferry, and
Toll Roads (056), Auto Insurance (057), Mass Transit
Systems (058), Taxicab, Railway, Bus, and Other Travel
(059)
Recreation Services (060), Books and Maps (061),
Magazines, Newspapers, Nondurable Toys (062)
Recreation and Sports Equipment (063)
Tobacco Products (026), Alcohol Off-Premise (027), Alcohol
On-Premise (028)
Furniture and Durable Household Equipment (036)
Higher Education (066), Nursery, Elementary and Secondary
Education (067), Other Education Services (068)
Prescription Drugs (044), Opthalmic Products and Orthopedic
Appliances (045), Physicians, Dentists, Other Medical
Professionals (046), Hospitals (047), Nursing Homes (048),
Health Insurance (049)
Nondurable Household Supplies and Equipment (037),
Domestic Service, Other Household Operation (043),
Business Services (050), Expense of Handling Life Insurance
(051), Pari-Mutuel Net Receipts (065), Religious and Welfare
Activities (069)

Note: A full description of the NBER CEX consumption categories can be found online at
The category number from the NBER CEX files are in
http://www.nber.org/ces_cbo/Cexfam.doc.
parentheses.

Appendix Table A.2
Mean Quarterly Expenditure (in 2005 dollars), Percent with Positive Expenditures, and
Expenditure Shares by Consumption Category, by Race
All
White
Black
Hispanic
Visible Expenditures

1,670
0.99
0.12

1,790
0.99
0.12

1,260
0.99
0.12

1,320
0.99
0.12

Shelter Expenditures

2,500
0.99
0.25

2,670
0.98
0.25

1,830
0.99
0.26

2,150
0.99
0.28

Food Expenditures

1,660
1.00
0.18

1,730
1.00
0.17

1,300
1.00
0.21

1,630
1.00
0.22

Utility Expenditures

740
0.99
0.08

760
0.99
0.07

730
0.99
0.11

650
0.99
0.09

Vehicle Service Expenditures

800
0.88
0.07

870
0.93
0.07

580
0.71
0.06

540
0.80
0.05

Other Transportation Expenditures

670
0.98
0.07

710
0.99
0.07

500
0.96
0.06

580
0.97
0.07

Entertainment Service Expenditures

580
0.98
0.05

660
0.99
0.07

290
0.95
0.04

330
0.95
0.04

Health Expenditures

410
0.85
0.04

470
0.89
0.04

250
0.74
0.03

270
0.76
0.03

Notes: See the notes to Table I for full sample description. See Appendix Table A.1 for the definition of
each consumption category. For each consumption category, the first row shows the average spending per
quarter in that category (in 2005 dollars, rounded to the nearest ten dollars), the second row shows the
fraction of households with positive spending in the consumption category, and the third row shows the
share of expenditures in the consumption category out of total expenditures. Columns 1-4, respectively,
show the relevant statistics for the total population, a sample with White heads, a sample with Black heads,
and a sample of Hispanic heads.

Appendix Table A.2 (continued)
All
White

Black

Hispanic

Home Furnishing Expenditures

310
0.83
0.03

350
0.86
0.03

190
0.71
0.02

220
0.79
0.02

Education Expenditures

250
0.43
0.02

290
0.46
0.02

170
0.35
0.02

120
0.30
0.01

Entertainment Durable Expenditures

250
0.80
0.02

290
0.85
0.02

110
0.64
0.01

140
0.72
0.02

Alcohol/Tobacco Expenditures

210
0.82
0.02

240
0.86
0.03

120
0.68
0.02

120
0.70
0.02

Other Expenditures

650
0.92
0.05

730
0.95
0.05

400
0.86
0.04

360
0.85
0.03

49,363

37,289

6,766

5,308

Sample Size

Appendix Table A.3
Mean and Standard Deviation of Male Labor Income by Race and State Using CPS Data
All
White
Black
Hispanic
Coefficient
Coefficient
Coefficient
Coefficient
Mean
of Variation
Mean
of Variation
Mean
of Variation
Mean
of Variation
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
DC
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI

30,346
40,425
33,421
26,983
36,057
39,302
44,472
35,153
35,396
32,577
34,767
33,651
31,728
37,934
34,380
32,685
34,921
31,597
30,775
31,690
40,196
39,941
37,748

1.13
0.97
1.17
1.11
1.19
1.08
1.06
0.98
1.33
1.17
1.11
0.98
1.07
1.07
0.99
0.97
1.09
1.15
1.16
1.11
1.05
1.08
1.04

35,071
43,715
38,440
29,215
45,185
42,132
47,665
38,148
60,269
36,898
40,551
36,828
33,275
42,859
35,432
33,480
36,422
32,379
35,643
31,677
46,347
42,208
40,029

1.06
0.90
1.11
1.07
1.08
1.04
1.02
0.95
1.06
1.12
1.03
0.99
1.07
1.00
0.97
0.96
1.09
1.15
1.07
1.11
0.95
1.05
1.00

17,809
31,985
26,070
15,905
27,050
24,826
24,922
25,390
22,847
20,492
24,363
31,158
11,511
22,434
23,032
20,041
26,793
21,102
17,460
29,120
27,443
23,961
22,252

1.15
1.35
0.81
1.05
1.27
1.07
1.05
1.01
1.20
1.16
1.26
0.84
1.40
1.25
1.01
0.92
0.85
0.94
1.11
0.77
1.24
1.45
1.17

26,371
40,835
23,664
22,339
24,456
29,310
28,062
26,864
23,020
26,844
28,050
29,573
21,417
26,981
27,290
21,260
27,561
26,878
30,640
53,447
31,327
21,414
30,429

0.84
1.12
1.30
1.32
1.16
1.26
1.50
1.04
1.40
1.23
0.95
0.82
0.85
1.17
1.17
0.90
1.04
1.08
1.18
0.83
1.21
1.11
1.16

Note: The table shows the means and coefficient of variation for male labor income by race and state from the 1990-2002 CPS. Data are averaged over the
entire sample period and are reported in 2005 dollars. The sample used is males aged 18-49 (inclusive). All data are weighted using the CPS weights.

All

MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY

Mean

Coefficient
of Variation

38,178
26,868
33,532
27,262
33,525
36,396
39,982
43,518
28,031
36,352
33,008
30,138
36,285
30,990
34,682
35,639
36,161
31,515
29,268
30,840
34,065
34,127
33,152
38,667
38,229
26,352
36,256
33,842

1.09
1.13
1.11
0.98
0.95
1.05
1.03
1.09
1.04
1.21
1.08
1.04
1.05
1.14
1.08
1.10
1.08
1.02
1.04
1.22
1.15
1.02
0.97
1.07
1.08
1.11
0.97
0.97

Appendix Table A.3 (continued)
White
Black
Coefficient
Coefficient
Mean
of Variation
Mean
of Variation

Hispanic
Coefficient
Mean
of Variation

39,522
32,271
34,943
28,016
34,673
40,452
39,972
48,838
34,296
42,313
36,642
31,107
38,046
33,472
36,645
37,553
38,216
35,637
30,517
33,051
42,797
35,382
33,344
42,737
39,699
26,534
37,812
34,564

24,157
31,987
27,648
24,904
23,320
26,510
37,150
28,339
23,175
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19,243
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1.16
1.32
0.93
0.64
0.95
1.19
1.10
1.40
0.91
1.25
1.08
0.55
1.24
0.99
1.75
1.28
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1.72
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1.26
1.14
0.89
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Figure I
Estimates of Non-Linear Visible Good Engel Curves:
Estimated Separately for Blacks and Whites
Notes: The figure shows the Engle Curve estimates of log visible expenditures on a quadratic in log total
expenditures separately for Blacks (solid line) and Whites (dotted line) using data from the CEX. Log total
expenditures and log total expenditures squared are instrumented using the same vector Income described
in the notes to Table II. The regressions are estimated over a similar range populated by both Black and
White households: households with quarterly total expenditure greater than $1,300 and less than $26,200
(in 2005 dollars). These total expenditures cutoffs are approximately the 1st percentile of the White
quarterly total expenditure distribution and the 99th percentile of the Black quarterly total expenditure
distribution, respectively.
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Figure II.A
Kernel Density of Black and White Annual Expenditures (CEX)
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Figure II.B
Kernel Density of Black and White Annual Family Income (PSID)
Notes: The figures show the kernel density of total annul expenditures from the CEX (panel A) and
average family income from the PSID (panel B) separately for Blacks and Whites. The samples used for
the kernel estimation are the same samples as described in the notes to Table I (for the CEX) and Table V
(for the PSID). Likewise, the measures of total expenditures and total family income are also described in
Section III.
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Figure III
Relationship between Conditional Log Visible Spending and Log of Mean Income,
by Race/State Cells
Notes: The figure plots the log of mean male labor income of race-state cells against the conditional log
difference in visible spending of race-state cells. The mean of male labor income for each race/state cell is
computed using CPS data as described in the note to Appendix Table A3. Visible spending shown for
race/state cells are dummies estimated on race/state interactions in a regression of log visible spending on
race/state dummies, total expenditure controls (instrumented with current income controls), and
demographics. The regression uses CEX data and is identical to the regression described in row (6) of
Table II aside from the fact that the race dummies are replaced with race/state dummies. The omitted
race/state dummy in the regression is White Alabamans, so conditional visible spending in each cell is
relative to White Alabamans. The figure presents results for 114 race-state cells. For the years studied, the
CEX does not interview households from ME, MT, ND, RI, SD, WV, and WY, so there is no spending on
households from these states. In addition, the number of observations for some race/state cells (Blacks in
Utah, for example) was very tiny. We therefore exclude observations from DE, ID, NE, NH, UT, and VT
from the data. The remaining sample covers 37 states plus DC, for three racial groups.

